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Abstract
We develop a two-sided asymmetric information model of asset sales that incorporates the key differences
from mergers and allows the information held by each party to be impounded in the transaction.  Buyer
information is conveyed through a first-stage competitive auction.  A seller with unfavorable information
about the asset accepts the cash offer of the highest bidder.  A seller with favorable information proposes a
take-it-or-leave-it counteroffer that entails buyer equity.  Thus, the cash-equity decision reflects seller, but
not buyer, information in contrast to theoretical and empirical findings for mergers.  The central prediction
of our model is that there are relatively large gains in wealth for both buyers and sellers in equity-based asset
sales, whereas cash asset sales generate significantly smaller gains that typically accrue only to sellers.  Our
empirical results are consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model.
Keywords: Asset sales, means of payment, auctions, two-sided asymmetric information. 
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1.  Introduction
Research on asset sales concludes that a firm sells an operating asset, such as a production facility
or a division, when another entity can generate greater value from it.  Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) report
that these transactions increase economic efficiency, a result that is consistent with positive valuation effects
for asset sales reported by Jain (1985), Klein (1986), and Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987).  These studies
implicitly treat asset sales as partial acquisitions that fall within the province of theoretical models of
mergers.  In this paper we develop a theoretical model of intercorporate asset sales that reflects the salient
legal and institutional characteristics that differentiate these transactions from mergers and that generates
predictions about the means of payment in asset sales that differ sharply from models of mergers such as
Hansen (1987), Fishman (1989), and Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel (1990).  The value of our approach
is reinforced by evidence that equity-based asset sales generate more favorable share price effects than cash
sales (Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (2005)), a finding that is opposite to the evidence for mergers (Travlos
(1987), Franks, Harris, and Mayer (1988), Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983), and Servaes (1991)), but is
corroborated in our empirical tests. 
Our two-stage model of asset sales consists of a competitive auction that is followed by bilateral
negotiations.  It explains the transaction’s financial structure as an informationally efficient mechanism for
the sale of an operating asset, where the seller and potential buyers possess private information that is
impounded in the transaction: the buyers’ information through competitive bidding, and the seller’s through
the deal’s financial structure.  As a result, the asset is allocated efficiently to the highest-valued use.  The
model generates detailed, unambiguous predictions about combined wealth gains from asset sales, the
distribution of the gains between buyers and sellers, and the determinants and valuation effects of the deal’s
financial structure.  We find that payment in the form of buyer equity signals favorable information about
the asset, implying greater gains in wealth relative to cash sales for buyers and sellers.  Sellers obtain gains
in both types of transactions, while buyers obtain significant gains only in equity-based deals.  Thus, in a
setting characterized by two-sided asymmetric information, the use of equity to acquire an asset has value-2
1Appraisal is a judicial hearing that determines the fair cash value to be paid for the shares of dissenting
shareholders.  Appraisal protects shareholders from managerial opportunism in a merger, a transaction in which final
period problems could be severe since the target ceases to exist after the deal and target managers would no longer
be subject to the constraints and monitoring of financial markets (Fischel (1983)). 
enhancing consequences, a finding that stands in contrast to theory and evidence for mergers or corporate
investments (Myers and Majluf (1984)). 
Our model incorporates the key features that distinguish asset sales from mergers.  One, corporate
law mandates that in a merger, target shareholders have irrevocable voting and appraisal rights.
1  Merger
models reflect this fact by assuming that the final stage of the game entails a take-it-or-leave-it offer from
the acquirer to the target.  In contrast, an asset sale is governed by contract law and the business judgment
rule, which limits disclosure and obviates shareholder participation, giving seller and buyer managers broad
legal discretion to privately develop a transaction structure.  Two, mergers are generally buyer-initiated,
while asset sales are generally seller-initiated.  Three, the sequential nature of entry in merger bidding is
conducive to a preemptive bid to deter entry by other potential bidders and limit competition (Fishman
(1989)).  In contrast, sellers of assets foster competitive and coetaneous bidding via an auction-like process,
followed by private negotiations between a seller and a selected buyer. 
Our model accords with the legal and institutional structure of asset sales by allowing both the
buyer and seller to have active roles in influencing the terms of the sale.  Each party holds important,
complementary private information.  A seller has detailed knowledge about the intrinsic quality of the asset
(including contingent liabilities) that is material to its value and is not readily available to potential buyers. 
Each potential buyer has private information about the value it can generate by conjoining the asset with its
existing assets.  Our model captures this situation in a double signaling game, incorporating an auction-type
procedure followed by bilateral negotiations between the seller and the highest bidder.  The seller begins the
game by initiating a first-stage competitive auction process.  Buyers can submit cash, equity, or mixed bids,
but in equilibrium buyers submit only pure-cash bids because equity signals negative information, lessening
the probability of winning the auction.  We show that equilibrium bids signal each buyer’s full set of private
information, allowing the seller to initiate exclusive bilateral negotiations with the buyer offering the highest3
bid.  In the second stage, the seller can terminate the sale, accept a buyer’s cash offer, or make a take-it-or-
leave-it counteroffer encompassing buyer equity.  The possibility that an asset sale can conclude with a
seller counteroffer is a key element of our model that cannot be applied to a merger where it is the buyer
that must submit the last (public) offer and by law target shareholders make the final decision on the bid. 
This difference is a reason why in merger models buyer private information determines the means of
payment, while in asset sales the financial structure of the deal is related to seller private information.  In
our model a seller with private information that the asset is of high value proposes to the highest bidder a
take-it-or-leave-it counteroffer that includes equity as a means of payment.  We show that to signal credibly
and ensure no imitation by a seller with a low-value asset, the seller of a high-value asset allows the buyer a
share of the gains from the deal.  When the seller’s private information indicates a low quality asset, there is
a cash transaction with the highest bidder.  Thus, in a cash deal the market’s response can be non-positive
for the buyer, while it is unambiguously positive for the seller, although weaker than for an equity deal. 
Overall, the model predicts that cash asset sales generate small gains in combined wealth relative to
equity-based asset sales, and these gains accrue to sellers, while in equity-based sales there are greater gains
in combined wealth that are shared by buyer and seller.  Viewed globally, buyers expect a share of the gains
from trade that corresponds to their information rent, which is the reward that elicits their willingness to
participate in the game and convey private information to the seller in the first-stage auction.  The lack of
profit to buyers in cash asset sales is more than compensated for by a positive expected return to equity-
based sales, reflecting the price a bidder is prepared to pay to win the first-stage auction.  The model also 
predicts that a transaction is more likely to be equity-based when seller private information is important,
whereas buyer information has no effect on the probability that a transaction will entail buyer equity. 
Given the model’s predictions about combined gains, we conduct empirical tests on samples of asset
sales in which both parties publicly trade.  Since the formation of blockholdings can create value ipso facto,
we study the set of equity-based asset sales in which no corporate blockholding is formed because the
relevant buyer equity is distributed to seller shareholders, not the seller firm.  Equity-based sales generate4
significant average excess returns of 6.9% for sellers, 3.4% for buyers, and combined gains are 4.2%.  For
cash sales, seller returns are 1.4%, but buyer returns and combined gains are not significant.  Relative to
transaction size, combined excess returns are large for equity-based deals, but negative and not significant
for cash deals.  Sellers capture 60% of the total gains in equity-based deals, but all of the gains in cash deals. 
For the full sample, equity-based plus cash deals, there are positive average returns to buyers as well as to
sellers.  We find significant improvements in buyer performance after equity-based deals, but no change
after cash deals.  A logit model indicates, consistent with our theory, that private information about the
seller, but not the buyer, affects the choice of the means of payment.  Overall, our work provides a valuable
framework for analyzing asset sales, demonstrates the importance of modeling two-sided asymmetric
information, and explains the link between gains in wealth and the means of payment. 
Among merger models, those closest in spirit to our asset sale model are Hansen (1987), Fishman
(1989) and Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel (1990) since their work is based on two-sided asymmetric
information.  These models predict a less favorable market reaction to equity-based mergers compared to
cash transactions, paralleling the results of merger models with only one-sided, acquirer-based private
information, such as Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990).  The contrast between this prediction and our result
that in asset sales the use of equity signals higher value relative to cash deals, reflects the important
institutional and legal differences between the two types of transactions with respect to the role of
shareholders and the nature of entry into the bidding competition.  After establishing the assumptions and
selling procedures of our model, we discuss the intuition as to why these factors generate such different
predictions about the effects of the means of payment for asset sales versus mergers. 
Our model bears some relation to divestiture models, such as Nanda and Narayanan (1999) and
Habib, Johnsen, and Naik (1997), where sellers have private information about assets to be divested, but
there is no role for informed buyers in such models, nor is there any consideration as to how the means of
payment affects wealth gains, issues central to our work.  Several studies, such as Fulghieri and Lukin
(2001), explain how high-value firms can use equity to attract informed investors and information5
acquisition activity, but there are no previous models that consider the joint problem of selling an asset and
the choice of the means of payment.  In the literature on non-cash auctions, Hansen (1985) and Crémer
(1987) show that an uninformed seller can extract all value with an equity offer, and Bhattacharyya and
Singh (1999) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2000) analyze non-cash bankruptcy auctions.  Our work
is also related to the “unrestricted” bidding model of De Marzo, Kremer, and Skrzypacz (2004). 
Nevertheless, none of these auction models takes into account two-sided asymmetric information, a key
element of our model. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, the asset sale game is presented,
and in Section 3 the major results are developed for a two-stage auction model where both parties have
asymmetric information.  In Section 4 sample development is described.  In Section 5 empirical results that
test the model’s predictions are reported.  Conclusions are offered in Section 6.
2.  A theoretical model of asset sales
2.1.  Basic assumptions
A firm, the seller, wishes to sell an indivisible, tangible, productive asset.  There are N > 1 potential
buyer firms.  We denote by xi the value of a buyer firm i if it does not purchase the asset.  The random
variable xi represents the intrinsic value of buyer firm i’s existing assets, including potential synergies, and
is privately known by buyer i.  We assume that buyers' types are i.i.d. on the interval [xL, xH] with
cumulative density function F.  The value of a buyer firm if it operates the asset depends on both parties’
private information.  The seller possesses non-public information about the intrinsic qualities and various
uses of an asset that it currently owns, while a buyer holds an advantage in knowing the intrinsic value of its
existing assets and the potential synergies of the asset for sale when combined with the buyer’s operations. 
We denote by w(v, xi) the value of buyer firm i if it operates the asset, where w(.) is strictly increasing in
both arguments and differentiable in xi . The random variable v represents the intrinsic quality of the asset
and is privately known by the seller.  We assume that v takes value vL with probability p and vH > vL with
probability 1- p.  We denote by y the value of the asset to the seller and we assume that w(vL, xi) - xi   y 6
2 If the seller’s value from using asset y depends monotonically on the intrinsic quality of the asset v, the
seller will require higher revenue for a high quality asset and lower revenue for a low quality asset.  At the same
time, as shown below, the seller obtains higher revenue in equilibrium when a high quality asset is sold.  The seller's
equilibrium revenue will meet its own value whatever the intrinsic quality of the asset v.
0.  Thus, an asset sale generates overall value equal to w(v, xi) - xi - y  0.  Moreover, we assume that
synergies are increasing in buyer and seller private information.  More precisely, w2(v, xi)w(v, xH)/xH, and
w2(v, xi) xi /w(v, xi) are nondecreasing in v, where w2(.) is the derivative of w with respect to xi, its second
argument.  The last two assumptions indicate that the value created by a deal is sufficiently sensitive to the
quality of the buyer’s existing assets xi and that this sensitivity does not decrease with the quality of the
asset for sale.  For simplicity, we assume that y is common knowledge.
2
2.2.   Selling procedures
We model the negotiation among the seller and the potential buyers as follows.  First, the seller
collects confidential offers for the asset from potential buyers, where the form of payment may encompass
any combination of cash and buyer common stock.  Let (Bi, Ci) be the offer from potential buyer i, where Ci
is the cash component of the offer and Bi denotes the fraction of the buyer’s total equity that is offered to the
seller.  We require that the cash component Ci be nonnegative, and that the equity component Bi not exceed
a fraction of ownership in the buyer, i.e., Ci  0, and 0  Bi  1. These offers are firm and the seller can
decide to (i) accept the offer of one of the buyers as is, (ii) enter into further exclusive negotiation with one
of the buyers, or (iii) not sell the asset.  In case (i) or (iii) the game ends with the seller's decision, with
either a transaction on the buyer's terms or no transaction.  When the seller chooses option (ii), it then
proceeds to conduct an exclusive negotiation with one selected buyer.  At the onset of this negotiation, the
seller provides a contractual letter of intent to the selected buyer indicating that it intends to sell the asset
and that the terms of any final agreement will be at least as favorable to the buyer as in the case in which the
buyer’s original offer (Bi, Ci) is accepted.  The seller then makes a take-it-or-leave-it counteroffer to the
buyer.  If the buyer accepts this counteroffer, the transaction is concluded on the terms of the counteroffer. 
If the counteroffer is rejected, no transaction ensues, but the seller fulfills its commitment by paying as7
3 A derivation of this compensation is found in Section 3.1. Our model can be generalized to reflect
different compensation rules.
compensation for the breach of contract what the buyer would expect to obtain if the initial offer had been
accepted.
3  Nevertheless, in equilibrium it will be in the buyer’s and seller’s interests to conclude the deal.
Let bidder i be the buyer that submitted the offer selected by the seller.  If the seller chooses option
(i), then the buyer’s original shareholders will receive an expected profit of
$B(xi, Bi, Ci) = (1- Bi) ( E[w(v, xi) | seller accepted (Bi, Ci) ] - Ci) - xi ,
and, when v  = v {vL, vH}, the seller’s expected profit is
$S(v, Bi, Ci) =  Bi (E[w(v, xi) | offer (Bi, Ci) ] - Ci) + Ci - y.
The counteroffer if the seller chooses option (ii) can encompass any combination of cash and buyer
equity.  We denote by c the cash component of the counteroffer while  denotes the fraction of the buyer's
total equity that the seller receives if its counteroffer is accepted.  Similar to a buyer’s offer, we require c 
0 and 0    1.  If the buyer accepts the counteroffer, it acquires the asset in exchange for a cash payment c
and a proportion of its equity .  Thus, if buyer i accepts the counteroffer (, c), the expected profit to the
buyer’s original shareholders will be
$B(xi, , c) = (1- ) (E[w(v, xi) | counteroffer (, c) ] - c)  - xi
and the seller's expected profit will be
$S(v, , c) =  (E[w(v, xi)| offer (Bi ,Ci ) ] - c)  + c - y8
4The decisive role of the seller’s final offer stage can be corroborated with the following counterfactual. 
Suppose that intercorporate asset sales were to be made subject to the same corporate statutes and laws that govern
mergers.  In our model, such a rule would take the form of a third round in which the buyer makes a final offer to
seller shareholders after the seller’s second-stage counteroffer.  It is possible to show that in this scenario the asset
will always be sold for cash since the seller has no incentive to disclose private information in a second-stage
counteroffer.
Finally, if the buyer rejects the counteroffer (, c), no transaction takes place and the buyer will be
appropriately compensated for breach of contract, receiving (1 - Bi )(w(vL,xi) - Ci) - xi, that is, the buyer’s
equilibrium gain in the case when its initial offer is accepted, as we demonstrate in the next section.
The two-stage approach of our model accords with the legal and institutional structure that applies
to asset sales and captures two important differences relative to merger models.  First, since the sale of an
asset is governed by contract law and the business judgment rule, an asset sale is a legally binding contract
between teams of buyer and seller managers who have the broad legal authority to conduct an asset sale, and
are insulated from shareholder voting and litigation.  In our model, both buyer and seller managers play
active roles in influencing the terms of the transaction.  We will show that as a result of the first-stage
auction-type bidding process, the seller is able to extract each buyer’s private information, and as a result
becomes the only party that has valuable private information.  Thus, after the auction, the seller retains
substantial bargaining power and can decide to conclude the auction or to open negotiations with the
selected buyer by making a take-or-or-leave-it counteroffer that reshapes the financial structure of the deal. 
Our prediction that a seller with favorable private information will prefer to be paid with buyer equity rather
than cash is a result of this structure.  By contrast, corporation law requires that a merger be approved by a
majority of target firm shareholders.  Merger models, such as Hansen (1987), Fishman (1989), and Eckbo,
Giammarino, and Heinkel (1990), incorporate this constraint by assuming that the acquirer must submit the
last offer to target shareholders, who then make the final decision to accept or reject it.  As a result, it is
buyer private information that determines the financial structure of the merger, with the acquirer preferring
to pay for the target with equity when its private information is unfavorable, and to use cash when its private
information is favorable.
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The second difference is that in a merger one buyer typically initiates the process, and rival bidders
emerge only subsequently.  The sequential nature of entry for merger bidding creates a rationale for the
initial bidder to make a preemptive cash bid to discourage (costly) entry by other bidders (Fishman (1989)). 
In contrast, in an asset sale the seller encourages competitive bidding by seeking out the participation of
multiple bidders from the outset, thus forestalling preemptive bidder strategies.  Our analysis shows that
when bidding is simultaneous or coetaneous, as is typical in asset sales, buyers reveal their private
information via cash offers so that the cash-equity choice is not related to acquirer asymmetric information.  
3.  Equilibrium
3.1.  Central results
We solve the game by backward induction.  To begin, consider the stage where buyer firms have
submitted their offers, the seller has selected one offer, and the seller must decide whether to accept it as is
or to make a counteroffer to the selected buyer.  Let (B, C) be the selected offer, and denote by x(B, C) =
E[xi | bidder i offers (B, C)] the seller’s expectation regarding the type of the potential buyer i that offered
(B, C).  We claim that, in equilibrium, after observing buyers’ bids, the seller will be able to deduce all
buyer private information on xi.  In other words, at this phase of the game all of the buyer’s private
information about its existing assets and their potential value when combined with the seller’s asset, is
revealed to the seller, leaving the seller’s private information as the only remaining source of uncertainty. 
We also claim that the selected offer provides the seller at least y, that is, its reserve value for the asset.  We
verify these claims in Proposition 2.  Fix x = x(B, C) and let v be the intrinsic value of the asset.  Then the
seller will make a counteroffer if it can find (*, c*) such that
subject to10
The first constraint states that a counteroffer is made only if, when accepted, it provides the seller with
strictly more than the buyer’s initial offer.  The second constraint implies that the buyer accepts the
counteroffer only if it provides a nonnegative profit and more than what it could claim if the negotiation
fails (the buyer’s expected payoff if the offer is rejected).  If no (*, c*) satisfying both constraints exists,
then the seller will accept the buyer’s offer as is.  
Since the seller has the ability to make a counteroffer and has private information on v, this phase of
the negotiation is a signaling game that, as usual, exhibits multiple equilibria.  In order to restrict the set of
equilibria of this game, we use the refinement known as D1 to define a buyer's out-of-equilibria beliefs
when it observes a counteroffer that was "unexpected" in equilibrium.  The refinement D1, introduced by
Cho and Sobel (1990), states that if the buyer observes an out-of-equilibrium counteroffer, it surmises that
this counteroffer comes from the seller type that is "more eager" to make it.  This refinement leads to a
unique separating equilibrium where the seller makes a counteroffer only if v = vH .  To credibly signal that
the intrinsic quality of the asset is high, the seller’s counteroffer includes payment in the form of buyer
equity.  Such a counteroffer maximizes seller revenue if v = vH , under the constraint that the seller would
prefer the buyer’s original offer if v = vL .  This constraint limits the fraction of equity that the high-value
seller can demand when v = vH .  More precisely, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 1:    Suppose the seller selects offer (B, C) that uniquely identifies the type x = x(B, C) of the
buyer that submitted this offer.  Then the signaling game has a unique separating equilibrium outcome
satisfying the D1 criterion, that has the following structure :
if v = vL, then the seller accepts the offer (B, C);
if v = vH, then the seller makes an all-equity counteroffer (*, c*) = (B + (1 - B)C/w(vL, x), 0) and
the buyer accepts the counteroffer. 
Thus, the equity component in the structure of the deal is lower for low quality assets than for high quality
assets.
Proof:  See Appendix A.11
Let us develop the intuition for the particular form of the counteroffer, (*, c*).  First, to establish
that the equilibrium counteroffer must be an all-equity offer (c* = 0), consider a hypothetical mixed
counteroffer with a positive cash component.  If this offer were to satisfy the incentive constraints necessary
for a separating equilibrium, then the seller with a high-value asset could propose a counteroffer with more
equity and less cash from which it derives a strictly higher payoff and that would still satisfy both incentive
constraints.  The reason for this result is that more equity leads to a greater payoff differentiation between
the two types, thus allowing the high-type to appropriate more value without risking imitation by the low-
type.  Any mixed offer is dominated by another offer with less cash, and only an all-equity offer is robust
against this argument.  Second, for an all-equity offer to be separating, we need to ensure that the incentive
constraint for the seller with the low-value asset is satisfied:
 B(w(vL, x) - C) + C - y  * w(vL, x) - y.
This result implies that * = B + (1 - B)C/w(vL, x) is the maximum equity participation for the seller with
the high-value asset that does not violate incentive constraints.  As a result, the seller must “leave money on
the table”.
Now, we turn to the first phase of the two-stage sales procedure where potential buyers compete in
making offers for the asset.  For the moment, we set aside the possibility that buyers make any offers other
than pure-cash offers (although these bids will be the equilibrium offers as we argue below).  Moreover,
each bidder anticipates that upon winning the auction, if the intrinsic quality of the asset is vL, it will pay its
bid Ci, whereas if the intrinsic quality of the asset is vH, its payment will entail buyer equity.
We focus on symmetric equilibria where a potential buyer's offer is a differentiable increasing
function C: [xL, xH] Ü
+ of its type, as is standard in auction theory.  Let C(.) be the bidding function in a
symmetric equilibrium.  Note that in equilibrium, x(0, C) is the inverse of the bidding function C(.).  With
bids in the form of cash, the seller will select the bidder that submits the highest bid, as this will be the12
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bidder that values the asset the most.  Then the best pure-cash bid for a potential buyer of type x will be the
solution to the following maximization problem:
subject to (1)
where FN(g) = F(g)
N-1 is the probability that the highest type among the potential buyer's competitors is
smaller than g.  This expression provides the expected payoff to a buyer of type x if it behaves like a buyer
of type g.  Note that the submission of an offer C(g) instead of C(x) affects the potential buyer's expected
profit in three ways.  First, it affects the probability of the bidder being selected by the seller.  Second, it
affects the cash payment when its offer is accepted, i.e., whenever v = vL .  Third, it affects the equity
payment that it will make whenever v = vH.  In fact, by bidding C(g) the bidder induces the seller to believe
that its type is g, information that will affect the seller’s counteroffer in the case v = vH.  This third factor
makes this competition different from that of a standard first-price sealed-bid auction.  In equilibrium,
bidder i must find it optimal to choose g = x.
By substituting (g)w(vL, g) into C(g), the buyer’s objective function (1) can be rewritten as
%(x, g)  =  (E[w(v, x)]  x  (g)( pw(vL ,g) + (1 - p)w(vH, x) )FN(g) (2)
The first order condition, using the derivative of expression (2) with respect to g,i s%2(x, g)|g =x = 0, which
leads to the following differential equation in (x):
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The final step of the analysis is to show that pure cash bids are indeed optimal and preferred by
buyers to any combination of cash and equity.  We show in Appendix B that if all but one potential buyers
adopt the pure-cash bidding strategy (0,C(x)) that solves expression (1), then the remaining bidder’s best
response is (0,C(x)).  We then obtain the following result:
Proposition 2:  There exists a symmetric equilibrium of the entire game, where all buyers are making fully
revealing pure cash bids in the first phase of the game.  A buyer of type x makes a pure cash offer (0,C(x))






Moreover, y < C(x) < w(vL,x) for all x [xL ,xH].
Proof:  See Appendix B. 
In our proof that pure-cash bids are an equilibrium, we first establish that no pure-cash deviation
can be profitable for this bidder.  Then, to complete the proof, we only need to show that there is no
profitable deviation (B, C) involving a strictly positive equity component.  The seller’s out-of-equilibrium
beliefs regarding the type x of the bidder that made such an offer must satisfy the D1 criterion.  Applying
this criterion to this phase of the game, it follows that an equity component in the offer is a negative signal
regarding the quality of the buyer’s existing assets.  In other words, the seller’s out-of-equilibrium belief
after observing such an offer makes the buyer’s offer less attractive relative to the offers of other buyers. 14
More precisely, the buyer could always find an alternative deviating offer in pure cash that, if accepted by
the seller, would provide the same payoff of the offer (B, C).  However, this pure cash deviation would have
a greater chance of being selected by the seller from among the different offers, as it does not include the
negative signal provided by the non-zero equity component in (B, C).  Thus, a deviating offer involving
equity is always dominated by a pure-cash deviation that in turn is not profitable. 
3.2.  Empirical implications
For purposes of empirical testing, the implications of our model focus on the following metrics.
Value creation.   One metric is the gain in the combined market value of the buyer and seller that
arises from an asset sale.  According to Proposition 1, assets with low intrinsic value should be sold for
cash, so cash asset sales should be associated with low wealth generation effects.  In contrast, equity-based
asset sales should be observed when the asset has a high intrinsic value, so these asset sales should be
associated with strong positive wealth generation effects.  Our model predicts that on average equity-based
asset sales generate a greater increase in combined value than cash asset sales.
The cash-equity choice.   In our model, the private information held by sellers plays a different role
than that of private information held by buyers.  Accordingly, the comparative statics of the two sources of
adverse selection exhibit distinctive empirical predictions about the financial structure of the transaction,
that is, the choice of equity versus cash.  To develop comparative statics with respect to seller private
information, consider the case of a seller that has no private information (that is, vL = vH ).  It is easy to show
that the model predicts that there will be only cash deals since there is no incentive for the seller to make an
equity counteroffer, while the reasons bidders prefer to submit cash offers remain unchanged.  The
importance of the seller’s private information on the value of post-transaction buyer equity increases in the
probability that the seller is privately informed.  The comparative statics are as follows:  an increase in the
importance of the seller’s private information increases the likelihood that the means of payment will be
equity-based, which is our second metric.  In contrast, in our model a change in the importance of the15
5 The value and the financial structure of the deal convey buyer and seller private information accurately. 
However, prior to the transaction the market will price the buyer at E[x] as there still is asymmetric information
regarding the buyer’s existing assets.  Hence, if the true gain of buyer shareholders is (1 -(x))w(v, x) - x, the
empirical observation of this gain using stock prices will be (1-(x))w(v, x) - E[x]. The effect of this pricing error is
an increase in the variance of the unexplained residual.
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buyers’ private information leaves the structure of the equilibrium unchanged with respect to the choice
between cash and equity, implying no effect on the frequency of equity versus cash deals. 
Value sharing.   A third metric measures how the value created by the transaction is shared between
the seller and the buyer's original shareholders.  The model predicts that the proportion of the gains received
by the buyer is greater in equity-based transactions than in cash transactions.  To see this point, we denote as
(v, x) the share of the value created by the asset sale that accrues to the original shareholders of the buyer,
for a given level of the intrinsic quality of the asset for sale and the buyer’s existing assets.  In equilibrium,
the observed profit to the buyer’s original shareholders is (1 - (x))w(v, x) - E[x],
5 so the observed (v, x) is
which is increasing in v,
6 the intrinsic value of the asset, that is, the private information of the seller.  Since a
greater intrinsic value v is associated with equity-based deals and a smaller intrinsic value with cash deals, 
the model predicts that on average sellers will appropriate a smaller proportion of the value created by
equity-based deals relative to cash deals.
Wealth gain vs wealth loss.  A fourth metric is the sign and magnitude of buyer and seller profits
across all asset sales (for cash asset sales as well as equity-based asset sales).  This metric allows us to
identify the party that has the most valuable information in an asset sale.
Buyer:  The ex-ante expected profit (empirically proxied by averaging over cash asset sales plus
equity-based sales) is positive because the buyer can extract an informational rent due to its private
information about its synergy with the asset.  The average profit in equity-based asset sales is larger than the
ex-ante profit because the value created in these deals is greater, and the buyer appropriates a larger share of16
this value.  Conversely, the buyer's profit in cash asset sales is smaller than the ex-ante profit.  It should be
noted that it is possible that buyers expect to lose money in cash asset sales.  Namely, from Proposition 2 it
follows that the ex-ante profit of a buyer goes to zero as its type approaches xL, which implies this buyer
type will lose money in a cash asset sale, but make a positive profit in an equity-based asset sale.  Note also
that as the importance of buyer private information narrows, its ex-ante payoff converges to zero.  In this
case, buyers on average will sustain losses in cash asset sales and gains in equity deals.  Conversely, if the
importance of buyer private information is large, the buyer informational rent will also be large and
consequently the average profit for buyers will be positive for cash deals.
Seller:   The ex-ante and ex-post profit of the seller are positive.  More precisely, the seller’s
average profit in an equity-based asset sale is greater than its ex-ante expected profit (empirically proxied by
averaging over cash asset sales plus equity-based sales), which in turn is larger than its average profit in a
cash asset sale, which is greater than zero.
4.  Sample development 
We construct samples of intercorporate sales of operating assets from 1989 through 2002, using
Factiva (formerly the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service) and Lexis-Nexis.  Ownership data for buyers and
sellers are from proxy statements from Edgar or the SEC File from Q-Data Corporation.  Other information
sources are the Wall Street Journal, Standard and Poor’s Stock Reports, Stock Guide, and Directory of
Corporations, and SEC filings.  The announcement date is the initial public report of the asset sale. 
Testing the predictions of the theoretical model requires that certain filters be applied to the data to
obtain the final samples of asset sales.  One filter is that both the buyer and seller must be publicly traded
firms with CRSP data.  Thus, transactions that involve a buyout firm or other private entity are excluded. 
This criterion ensures that the combined gains in wealth and the distribution of the gains between the buyer
and the seller can be evaluated for each transaction. A second filter is that specific information about the
terms of the transaction is publicly reported, including whether the payment is in cash or is equity-based. 
Three, to minimize reporting bias, and increase the likelihood that the transaction is material, an asset sale17
must have a transaction price of at least $100 million, and the seller must not be in financial distress.  Four,
the operating asset must be wholly-owned by the seller prior to the sale, and the transaction must transfer
the seller’s full ownership of the asset to the buyer.  An additional filter for equity-based asset sales is that
the relevant shares of buyer stock are not paid to the selling firm, and instead, are conveyed directly to its
shareholders, ensuring that the seller does not become a corporate blockholder in the buyer.  This empirical
strategy generates a sample of equity-based transactions that has no overlap with previous studies (Allen
and Phillips (2000) and Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (2005)).  Our samples consist of 37 equity-based
asset sales and 93 cash sales.  The events are well distributed over the sample period. 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1.  Dollar values are in constant (1997) dollars.  Both
cash and equity-based asset sales are major transactions between large capitalization firms.  The average
(median) value of cash asset sales is $1.38 ($1.01) billion compared to $1.91 ($1.20) billion for equity-
based sales.  Mean (median) capitalization is large for both buyers and sellers in equity-based sales, $9.30
($1.98) billion and $7.69 ($1.93) billion, respectively, but firms in cash asset sales are larger still, $20.85
($5.98) billion for buyers and $14.85 ($10.02) billion for sellers.  The mean (median) ratio of transaction
price to seller market value is 0.77 (0.58) for equity-based sales, and is higher than the ratio of 0.31 (0.11)
for cash sales, with the difference in means (medians) statistically significant.  For buyers, the mean
(median) ratio is 0.90 (0.45) in equity-based sales, which is larger than the mean (median) ratio of 0.49
(0.13) in cash sales, and the difference in means (medians) is statistically significant.  A broad range of
industries is represented in both samples.  There are 33 4-digit SIC codes among the 37 buyers and 32 4-
digit SIC codes among the 37 sellers in the equity-based sample, and 64 4-digit SIC codes among the 93
buyers and 65 4-digit SIC codes among the 93 sellers in the cash sample.  In the equity-based sample, buyer
equity is the dominant means of payment, representing on average (median) 71.3% (70.3%) of the
consideration paid.  All-equity deals comprise 38% of the equity sample.  On average (median), the buyer
equity conveyed to sellers as a proportion of buyer shares outstanding is 28.9% (24.1%). 18
7 Institutions are investment firms, banks, insurance firms, college endowments, and 13F money managers.
Buyers and sellers in cash asset sales have dispersed ownership structures.  Mean (median) insider
holdings by top executives and members of the board of directors as a percent of outstanding shares is 5.0%
(1.8%) for buyers and 5.3% (1.0%) for sellers.  For equity-based asset sales, mean (median) insider holdings
are 9.4% (1.6%) for buyers.  Sellers in equity-based sales have significantly greater insider holdings, with a
mean (median) of 11.5% (4.6%), than sellers in cash sales, whereas the differences between the two sets of
buyers are not significant.  In each sample there are similar mean (median) institutional holdings, with
50.7% (54.0%) for buyers and 48.7% (51.1%) for sellers in cash sales, and 52.0% (52.2%) for buyers and
53.9% (56.8%) for sellers in equity-based deals.
7  These figures are well above average institutional
holdings at NYSE/ASE firms (McConnell and Servaes (1990)).  
In equity-based asset sales, the shareholders of the selling firm take ownership of relevant buyer
shares based on a pro rata distribution established in the transaction agreement.  Seller blockholdings,
defined as a shareholding of 5% or more of seller shares, are rare, since there is only one instance, and in
this specific case, the size of the asset sale implied that the shareholder did not become a 5% blockholder in
the buyer.  We also examine proxy statements for each buyer in the subsequent year, and find that no
blockholders emerge.  Thus, the equity-based transactions do not induce the formation of blockholdings at
buyer firms.  Blockholders are also rare among the buyers, given only two cases.  There is a modest
reduction in the mean ratio of insider holdings to total outstanding shares at buyers, from 9.38% to 6.93%,
during the subsequent year as expected, an expected result since shares issued as payment for an asset
increase the buyer’s total outstanding shares, but the change is not significant (p=0.35).  There is a trivial
(p=0.87) increase in the median ratio of insider holdings at buyers after the sale.  Overall, the equity-based
asset sales have modest effects on buyer ownership structure.  
5.  Empirical results
5.1.  Valuation effects on buyers and sellers19
8All univariate results reported in this study are robust with respect to the use of three and four factor
(Carhart (1997)) market models. 
In Table 2, we report valuation effects on buyers and sellers at announcements of intercorporate
asset sales, using standard market model methodology.
8  For cash transactions, the two-day average excess
return for sellers is 1.43% (t-statistic of 5.31), the median return is also highly significant, and the quartile
data indicate that the mean return is not the result of outliers.  The five-day average excess return (not
reported in the table) is 2.21% (t-statistic of 5.03).  These returns are similar to seller returns reported by
Klein (1986), Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987), Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995), John and Ofek (1995), and
Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (2005).  The two-day average excess return to buyers in cash sales is close
to zero, -0.03% (t-statistic of -0.12), and the median and quartile returns indicate that the mean is not the
result of outliers.  The five-day return is 0.48% (t-statistic of 0.82).  As in previous studies, these results
suggest that the market does not view cash asset sales as positive net present value transactions for buyers. 
The evidence indicates that, on average, the gains in value from cash asset sales accrue solely to sellers. 
Although average excess returns are the standard method of reporting event study results, we also
report transaction returns (wealth gains as a fraction of transaction values) for buyers and sellers to take
account of the size of the transaction, to draw accurate comparisons between cash versus equity-based asset
sales, and to test the predictions of the model.  For cash sales, the two-day average transaction return to
sellers is small, 0.21%, and not statistically significant (t-statistic of 0.02).  However, the median figure of
6.50% is statistically significant (p=0.01).  For buyers, the average (median) transaction return is negative, -
14.15% (-1.01%), and is not statistically significant given a t-statistic of -1.34 (p=0.24).  This lack of
significant transaction returns to buyers corroborates the non-positive average buyer returns for cash asset
sales, and is consistent with our model’s prediction that buyer gains in cash asset sales should be low
relative to equity-based sales.
From the perspective of our theoretical model, combined returns that weight announcement excess
returns of buyers and sellers by pre-announcement market capitalization serve as a gauge of the combined
gain in value from an asset sale.  Moreover, since investors hold diversified portfolios, our focus is on20
assessing the extent to which intercorporate asset sales enhance combined shareholder wealth and thus
contribute to economic efficiency, as well as on the distribution of wealth gains between buyers and sellers. 
While prior studies include asset sales in which one participant is not publicly traded, our sample design
requires that each buyer and seller are publicly traded.  These combined returns measure the difference
between pre-transaction versus post-transaction values of buyers and sellers, including the value of the
relevant asset, and hence reflect the information that is conveyed by the financial structure of the deal.
For cash asset sales the combined mean (median) returns are small, 0.15% (0.28%), and not
significant given a t-statistic of 0.58 (p=0.41), so the null hypothesis of zero gains cannot be rejected.  In
(constant) dollars, the average change in combined value for cash sales is a loss of -$41.4 million, while the
median change is a gain of $33.2 million, both modest figures relative to the mean (median) value of the
transactions ($1,380.9 ($1,010.7) million).  For the ratio of the combined dollar gains for cash sales relative
to transaction values, the mean (median) combined excess transaction return is -13.94% (2.80%) and is not
significant, given a t-statistic of -1.06 (p=0.67). We conclude that cash asset sales generate little combined
gain in shareholder wealth, and any gains that do occur accrue to sellers, results that are consistent with the
predictions of our theoretical model. 
For equity-based asset sales, the two-day average excess return to sellers is 6.92%, (t-statistic of
13.57); the five-day return is similar, 6.80% (t-statistic of 8.95).  The average (median) transaction return to
sellers is 20.00% (9.48%), and is statistically significant.  These results are not due to outliers, since there
are similar results at each percentile level.  The positive and significant returns suggest that equity-based
asset sales, like cash sales, are positive net present value transactions for selling firms.  Moreover, seller
two-day average (median) excess returns and transaction returns in equity-based sales are significantly
greater at the 1% (10%) level than the comparable returns in cash sales.  Thus, equity-based asset sales
generate greater gains to sellers than cash sales.
For buyers in equity-based sales, the two-day average excess return is positive, 3.44% (t-statistic of
6.11), and the five-day return is similar, 3.92% (t-statistic of 4.23); the median return, 2.31%, is also highly21
significant.  These results indicate that equity-based asset sales are positive net present value transactions for
buyers, in contrast to the non-significant returns to buyers in cash asset sales.  The mean (median) two-day
return to buyers is significantly greater in equity-based deals than in cash sales (p-value of 0.01 (0.00)). 
Moreover, the mean (median) buyer transaction return of 20.15% (4.87%) is also statistically different from
zero, and significantly greater than the comparable return to buyers in cash sales.  Thus, the greater seller
gains in equity-based asset sales do not represent a redistribution of wealth from buyers.  Instead, there are
greater gains to both sellers and buyers in equity-based asset sales relative to cash sales. 
An estimate of the expected (ex ante) excess returns to buyers and sellers of assets is obtained by
evaluating the average excess returns to buyers and to sellers over both samples of asset sales (130
transactions).  The global average excess returns are 0.96% (t-statistic of 4.17) for buyers and 2.99% (t-
statistic of 11.97) for sellers (not reported in the table).  Thus, although buyers do not obtain positive
average excess returns in cash asset sales, when all asset sale transactions are taken into account, buyer
average excess returns are positive, suggesting that buyers extract an informational rent that is based on
their private information about expected firm value, including the asset.  From the perspective of our theory,
these global results are consistent with the view that buyer information is valuable, but is not sufficient in
magnitude to generate a positive average excess return to buyers in cash sales.
The mean (median) combined gains from equity-based deals relative to the market values of the
participants are 4.17% (2.35%) with a t-statistic of 4.55 (p=0.00), and are significantly greater (p=0.00) than
the comparable figures for cash transactions.  The combined mean (median) transaction return to buyers and
sellers in equity-based asset sales is 40.15% (17.63%), significant at the 1% level, and the difference in
means (medians) versus cash asset sales is statistically significant at the 1% (1%) level.  Since the average
gain in value for an equity-based asset sale is greater than for a cash asset sale, even though no blockholding
is formed, our evidence suggests that the large incremental change in shareholder wealth is due to the
equity-based structure of the transaction, and not to a change in ownership structure.  Thus, equity-based
asset sales are associated with expectations of important improvements in economic efficiency.  Moreover,22
dollar gains in combined value generated by equity-based asset sales are economically meaningful, given an
average (median) gain of $913.8 million ($139.4 million) per deal. 
Our findings complement empirical results reported by Allen and Phillips (2000) and Slovin,
Sushka, and Polonchek (2005) who find positive effects on issuers of equity in transactions that create
corporate blockholders.  However, our evidence provides a more definitive test of the favorable signal
content of the transfer of assets through equity-based transactions given a sample design that excludes
events that result in the formation of corporate blockholdings.  Thus, we conclude that equity-based asset
sales contribute to economic value because they convey positive information about the value of the asset
being sold and expectations of heightened future profitability from the buyer’s use of the asset.  As a result,
our evidence is consistent with the central prediction of our theoretical model that an equity-based structure
for an intercorporate asset sale is associated with a greater gain in overall value. 
5.2.  The choice between cash and equity and the effect of asymmetric information measures
We estimate a binomial logit model of the means of payment decision using the maximum
likelihood method where the value function for the logit is specified as a linear function of firm-specific
variables that serve as proxies for asymmetric information, plus an error term.  The coefficients of the logit
provide an estimate as to how an increase in a specified asymmetric information variable affects the
marginal likelihood that an asset sale will involve buyer equity.  As discussed in Section 3.2, our theory
predicts that the private information characteristics of the buyer should be irrelevant to the choice of cash
versus equity, while an increase in the probability that the seller has private information regarding the asset
implies a higher frequency of equity-based deals.  In contrast, merger models predict that it is buyer private
information that is crucial for the choice of the means of payment.  
We include several variables as proxies for asymmetric information.  Since stock liquidity can be
expected to be related to the degree of firm asymmetric information, we specify the average relative bid-ask
spread (bid-ask spread divided by share price) and trading volume (relative to shares outstanding) during the
month prior to the transaction, where a greater bid-ask spread indicates greater asymmetric information and23
9 If the asset is small relative to the buyer, the seller information on v will have little impact on w and will
not be large enough to justify the expense of any fixed costs incurred to pursue an equity transaction.  Such fixed
costs exist in the form of the additional costs of negotiation and verification in the case of an equity deal. 
greater trading volume indicates less asymmetric information.  We test three variables that are based on
analyst earnings forecasts, using IBES data.  Two variables measure the magnitude of analysts’ earnings
surprises and the dispersion among analysts’ earnings forecasts, on the assumption that each is positively
correlated with the degree of information asymmetry between managers and investors (Lang and Lundholm
(1996) and Gomes and Phillips (2005)).  The earnings surprise variable is computed as the absolute value of
the difference between the median quarterly earnings estimates of analysts and the actual quarterly earnings
per share of the relevant firm, normalized by stock price, averaged over the previous year.  The earnings
dispersion variable is the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts, normalized by stock price,
averaged over the previous year.  The third variable is the number of analysts that follow the stock, on the
assumption that an increase in analyst coverage is associated with a reduction in asymmetric information. 
We test two variables that measure a firm’s investment alternatives, and thus are likely to be positively
correlated with asymmetric information.  One variable is research and development expenditures divided by
(lagged) property, plant, and equipment; the other variable is the firm’s market to book ratio. 
The importance of seller private information for post-transaction value and the seller’s gain is
related to the size of the asset as a fraction of the post-transaction buyer.
9  Thus, we include in each
specification the value of the relevant asset scaled by the value of the buyer plus the asset, and expect that
this variable will have a positive effect on the probability of an equity-based deal. 
The logit results are reported in Table 3, where the dependent variable is equal to one when a
transaction involves buyer equity and zero for cash transactions.  In the first logit specification, each
corporate characteristic refers to the seller, in the second, each corporate characteristic refers to the buyer,
and the third includes both sets of variables.  In specification (1), several asymmetric information variables
for the seller have the correct sign and are statistically significant.  The estimated coefficients imply that the
probability that the transaction will be equity-based rises with an increase in earnings surprises and an
increase in research and development expenditures, and it falls with an increase in the number of analysts24
that follow the firm and an increase in trading volume.  In addition, as predicted, the probability that an
asset sale will entail buyer equity increases as the size of the transaction increases relative to the size of the
buyer.  Thus, the probability that an asset sale will entail informationally sensitive securities (buyer equity)
is related to variables that are proxies for the extent of asymmetric information about the seller.  In
comparison, in specification (2) none of the asymmetric information variables for the buyer are significant.  
Specification (3) incorporates the full set of seller and buyer variables, and the results are broadly similar to
the other two equations.  Overall, the logit results are consistent with a central prediction of our theoretical
model, namely, that it is asymmetric information about the seller, and not the buyer, that influences the
choice of equity versus cash in an intercorporate asset sale.  
5.3.  Distribution of wealth gains between buyers and sellers
With regard to the distribution of gains, our model predicts that the value of the variable , the share
of the value created by the asset sale that accrues to the buyer’s original shareholders, should be greater in
equity-based deals than in cash deals.  The values for  (explained in Section 3.2) derived from the sample
are consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model that buyers sustain a greater proportion of the
gains in equity-based deals than in cash deals.  The calculated mean (median) values of  are 0.2580
(0.3311) in equity-based deals, both statistically significant at the 1% level, and 0.0722 (-0.1069) in cash
deals, neither statistically significant.  The difference between these means (medians) is statistically
significant with p=0.00 (p=0.00).
Overall, our results suggest that equity-based asset sales generate positive and significant excess
returns for both buyers and sellers, and that buyers obtain a substantial share of the gains generated by these
deals.  Consistent with the predictions of our model, for cash asset sales there are relatively small increases
in shareholder wealth that accrue almost exclusively to sellers, while for equity-based asset sales there are
significantly greater increases in wealth that are shared between buyers and sellers.  
5.4.  Cross-sectional regressions25
Cross-sectional regressions are estimated for the asset sale returns.  The dependent variable in one
set of regressions consists of buyer excess returns, and in the other set consists of seller excess returns. 
Independent variables reflect the proportion of the transaction price that is in the form of buyer equity, deal
size relative to buyer and seller, and characteristics of the participating firms, including variables that reflect
financial characteristics, performance, size of the two firms, and proxies for asymmetric information (see
Section 5.2).  Consistent with our theoretical model, the regression results indicate that the proportion of the
transaction price paid in buyer equity has a positive and significant effect on buyer returns and on seller
returns, with this variable obtaining t-statistics of 3.84 and 3.00, respectively, corroborating the univariate
results.  However, all independent variables that reflect the characteristics of the participating firms,
including the proxies for asymmetric information, consistently fall short of statistical significance,
suggesting that such variables do not provide additional explanatory power once the percentage of equity is
specified in a regression.  These independent variables are also not significant when transaction returns for
buyers and sellers are the dependent variables.  Since only the proportion of equity in the deal is statistically
significant, the regression results are not reported in the tables.
5.5.  Operating performance of buyers and sellers
We examine the subsequent operating performance of buyer and seller firms to assess whether the
increase in value at announcements of equity-based transactions is a precursor to improved operating
performance.  We apply the Barber and Lyon (1996) adjustment methodology.  The fiscal year in which the
asset sale occurs is defined as year 0.  The matching procedure selects benchmark firms, based on data in
year -1, that have the same 4-digit SIC code and market capitalization that is within a 90% to 110% range of
the sample firm.  Accounting data are from the Compustat Industrial and Research database.  The two
performance measures are return on assets, ROA (operating income before depreciation, interest, taxes, and
extraordinary items, divided by average total assets) and return on sales, ROS (same definition of operating
income, but divided by total sales).  After winsorizing the data, we obtain the mean and median changes in
benchmark-adjusted operating performance for years -1 to +4.  26
In Panel A of Table 4, buyer firms in equity-based asset sales outperform benchmark firms for each
year after the transaction.  These results suggest that the positive returns to buyer firms at announcements of
equity-based asset sales reflect the market’s anticipation of an improvement in subsequent buyer operating
performance as a result of the transaction, with the gains in wealth generated by these transactions being
shared between buyers and sellers.  In contrast, buyers that acquire assets for cash do not show any
significant improvement in subsequent benchmark-adjusted operating performance, as reported in Panel B. 
The difference in the means and medians between the changes in operating performance for buyers in
equity-based asset sales versus buyers in cash asset sales become statistically significant two years after the
transaction.  By comparison, neither set of seller firms show any evidence of significant changes in
subsequent benchmark-adjusted operating performance, so there is no evidence of improvement in seller
firm profitability.  Overall, the results indicate that equity-based asset sales are associated with an
improvement in the subsequent operating performance of buyers, as well as a greater increase in shareholder
wealth, relative to cash asset sales.
6.  Conclusions
We develop a theoretical model of intercorporate asset sales based on the perspective that two-sided
asymmetric information problems and the choice of the means of payment play central roles in these
transactions.  As a result of its ownership of the asset that is to be sold, the seller has private information
that is material to the value of the asset, while each potential buyer has private information about its own
existing assets and the value that can be generated if the asset is conjoined with them.  Our theory generates
a broad set of predictions about the overall gains in wealth from asset sales, the distribution of the gains
between buyers and sellers, and the different roles that buyer and seller private information have in
determining the terms of the transaction.  We model the asset sale process as a double signaling game and
show that the asset is allocated efficiently and that each party’s information is impounded in the transaction: 
buyer information in competitive bidding, and seller information in establishing the financial structure of the
deal.  Our work provides valuable perspective as to why existing theoretical models of mergers are not27
adequate for explaining intercorporate asset sales, and explains why empirical results on the choice between
the use of equity versus cash in asset sales differ from the results for mergers.  
The structure of our model reflects two key characteristics of asset sales.  First, asset sales entail
auction-like procedures early in the process that are designed so that the seller can select the best buyer from
a pool of candidates.  Second, asset sales are governed by the business judgment rule which gives selling
firm managers the flexibility to make a final, take-it-or-leave-it counteroffer to the (selected) bidder.  This
feature is crucial for distinguishing asset sales from mergers, which are subject to disclosure requirements
and a final vote for approval or rejection by target shareholders.  In our model, the selling firm commits to
an auction-type procedure that enables it to elicit buyers’ private information about the asset and to choose
the buyer with the highest post-transaction value.  If the seller’s private information indicates that the asset
is of low value, a cash deal is concluded with the highest bidder.  When the seller’s private information
indicates that the value of the asset is high, the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it counteroffer to the highest
bidder that entails the issuance of buyer equity to the seller, signaling the positive information that the asset
is of high value.  The terms of this counteroffer insure that the seller of a low-value asset would not imitate
the equity-based counteroffer.  The model predicts strong gains in combined wealth and positive excess
returns for both buyers and sellers for equity-based asset sales.  In contrast, the model predicts only modest
combined wealth gains in cash transactions, that are largely appropriated by sellers.  A central feature of our
model is the prediction that asymmetric information about the bidder’s existing assets has no impact on the
determination of the means of payment in an asset sale.  Instead, the choice of the financial structure of the
deal reflects only seller private information.
We test the model by analyzing the share price effects for a sample of cash asset sales and a set of
equity-based asset sales that do not create a corporate blockholding in the buyer.  The empirical results are
consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model.  Cash asset sales generate positive returns to sellers,
negative and not significant returns to buyers, and no significant change in combined wealth.  In contrast,
equity-based asset sales generate large combined gains in wealth, with large positive excess returns to both28
buyers and sellers that are significantly greater than the gains in cash asset sales.  Sellers capture about 60%
of the combined gains in wealth in equity-based deals, but all of the gains in cash deals.  When viewed
globally, buyers obtain a share of the overall gains generated by asset sales.  The estimation results for a
logit model of the choice of the means of payment indicate that asymmetric information about the seller, and
not about the buyer, influences the choice of equity versus cash in intercorporate asset sales.  We also find
significant improvements in the subsequent operating performance of buyers in equity-based deals, but no
changes in performance after cash deals.  Overall, our findings demonstrate that selling firms establish a
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Appendix A.
Proof of Proposition 1
We construct the necessary structure of a separating equilibrium counteroffer.  First, suppose that x is
common knowledge at this stage of the negotiation and that C < w(vL, x) (we will show in Proposition 2 that
this is indeed the case).  If the seller makes a counteroffer (*, c*) only when v = vH , the equilibrium is
separating.  It follows that
E[w(v,x) | seller accepted (B, C) ]  =  w(vL, x),
E[w(v,x) | counteroffer  (*, c*) ]  =  w(vH, x).
Thus, the buyer is willing to accept a counteroffer (*, c*) if
Second, observe that when v = vL, the seller weakly prefers the initial offer (B, C) to the counteroffer (*,
c*)  as the latter would provide a profit equal to 
* w(vL, x) - y = B(w(vL, x) - C) + C - y.
When v = vH, the seller strictly prefers the counteroffer to accepting the offer (B, C) since 
* w(vH, x) - y  >  B(w(vH, x) - C) + C - y,
where the right-hand side would be its profit from accepting the buyer’s initial offer.  We are left to show
that (i) there is no counteroffer (’, c’) g (*, c*) that provides a higher profit for the seller, and (ii) that the
equilibrium is unique.30
10 If q(vL) = q(vH) , then the out-of-equilibrium path belief can be freely chosen between 0 and 1. 
qv q wvx c c y vx
q S (): a r g m i n( ' ( (,) ' ) ' ) (,)












wvx c c y
()
(,)







(i)  In order to show that there is no better separating offer, we determine the buyer's
out-of-equilibrium beliefs using the D1 criterion.  First, we describe how the D1 refinement applies to this
signaling game.  Let $
*
S(vL, x) and $
*
S(vH, x) be the seller's equilibrium profit for v = vL and v = vH ,
respectively.  Suppose that the buyer observes an out-of-equilibrium counteroffer (’, c’).  For each seller's
type v{vL, vH }, let q(v) be the minimum probability of acceptance that makes this counteroffer attractive to
the seller:
Then, the D1 criterion requires that the buyer believes that the deviation (’, c’) comes from the seller's type
that would find it attractive for the smallest acceptance probability,
10 i.e., 
First consider a deviation (’, c’) that is potentially profitable for the seller when v = vH, in the sense that
’(w(vH, x) - c’) + c’ - y   > $
*
S(vH, x).  It can be verified that the deviation (’, c’) violates the seller’s
incentive compatibility constraint and therefore will also be potentially profitable for the seller when v = vL.
Thus,
’(w(v, x) - c’) + c’ - y   > $
*
S(v, x)                  (A1) 
for v  {vL, vH}.  Then according to the D1 criterion, the buyer will believe that v = vL as q(vL) < q(vH).  To
see this point, note that $
*
S(v, x) = * w(v ,x) - y for v{vL ,vH }, and so31
Thus, q(vL) < q(vH) if and only if *(1 - ’)c’ + y (’ - *) > 0, which is trivially verified for ’  * and c’
> 0.  To verify that q(vL) < q(vH) for ’ < * and c’ 0, observe that any (’, c’) must satisfy expression
(A1).  Multiplying both sides of expression (A1) by *, adding  y(’-*) to both sides and rearranging, we
have *(1 - ’)c’ + y (’ - *) > (* - ’)(w(v, x) - y), which is strictly positive for all ’ < *.
Thus, after observing an unexpected counteroffer (’, c’) satisfying expression (A1), the buyer will
believe that v = vL and will reject such a counteroffer.  In fact, expression (A1) and 
E[v| (’, c’)] = vL  imply
$B(x, ’, c’)  =  (1- ’) (w(vL, x) - c’)  - x  < (1 - B)(w(vL, x) - C) - x ,
which means that the buyer prefers to reject the counteroffer (’, c’) and to claim the compensation (1-
B)(w(vL, x) - C) - x instead.  For the same reason, a deviating counteroffer that is potentially profitable for
the seller only when v = vL will induce the buyer to believe v = vL and to prefer the compensation (1-
B)(w(vL, x) - C) - x  rather than to accept such a counteroffer.  Thus, the seller cannot find an alternative
counteroffer (’, c’) that is better than (*, c*) and that is acceptable to the buyer. 
(ii)  To show uniqueness, we demonstrate that any equilibrium where (H, cH) g (*, c*) is the offer
for type v = vH , does not survive the D1 criterion.  Consider an equilibrium where  (L , cL) and $S(vL, x) are
the format of payment and the seller's profit, respectively, when v = vL; similarly, let (H, cH) and $S(vH, x)
be the format of payment and the seller's profit, respectively, when v = vH.  The incentive compatibility
constraint for the seller requires
$S(vL, x) = L(w(vL, x) - cL ) + cL - y  H(w(vL, x) - cH ) + cH - y     (A2)
In order to show that there are no separating equilibria surviving D1 that are different from the one
described in Proposition 1, we proceed in two steps.32
First, we show that in any separating equilibrium it must be that $S(vL, x) = B(w(vL, x) - C) + C - y.
This is true for all equilibria where the seller accepts the buyer’s offer when v = vL.  In a separating
equilibrium where the seller makes a counteroffer (cL, L) when v = vL, the type v is revealed in t=1, and
therefore the overall value created is w(vL, x) - x - y.  Note that the buyer’s equilibrium payoff must not be 
smaller than what the buyer can obtain by rejecting the counteroffer, that is (1 - B)(w(vL, x) - C) - x.  It
follows that what remains for the seller is $S(vL, x)  B(w(vL, x) - C) + C - y.  However, the seller always
has the option to accept the buyer's cash offer and receive B(w(vL, x) - C) + C - y.  Thus, $S(vL, x) = B(w(vL,
x) - C) + C - y . 
Second, we show that a separating equilibrium different from the one described in Proposition 1
does not survive the D1 refinement criterion.  Consider an equilibrium where (H, cH) g (*, c*).  Take a
deviation for the seller that consists of making the counteroffer (’ + , 0), where  > 0 and is small, and ’
satisfies ’w(vH, x) - y = $S(vH, x) = H(w(vH, x) - cH) + cH - y.  If such a counteroffer is accepted, this would
clearly be a profitable deviation for the seller when v = vH, thus q(vH ) < 1.  Note that $S(vL, x) = B(w(vL, x) -
C) + C - y and the incentive compatibility constraint (A2) imply
$S(vL, x) = B(w(vL, x) - C) + C - y  H(w(vL, x) - cH) + cH - y  ’ w(vL, x) - y                        (A3)
where the last inequality follows from the definition of ’ , implying
H(w(vL, x) - cH) + cH  - ’ w(vL, x) = cH(1- H)( w(vH, x) - w(vL, x) )/w(vH, x)  0                     (A4)
If cH = 0, the first inequality in (A3) is strict because (H, cH) g (*, 0).  If cH > 0, the second inequality in
(A3) is strict because of (A4).  Therefore, when v = vL and for  > 0 but small, the seller strictly prefers the
equilibrium payoff  B(w(vL, x) - C) + C - y  to the deviation obtained if counteroffer (0, ’ +  ) is accepted. 
This implies q(vL)  1.  Thus, according to the D1 criterion, when the buyer observes the out-of-equilibrium33
counteroffer (0, ' +  ), it believes v = vH and therefore will accept such a counteroffer.  Hence, the seller
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Proof of Proposition 2
Proof:  Consider a buyer whose competitors use the bidding strategy (0, C(x)) described in Proposition 2. 
First, we show that C(x) is the buyer’s best pure-cash response.  Second, we show that no bid including
equity can provide this buyer with an expected payoff greater than a pure-cash bid. 
The first order condition when the buyer is restricted to pure-cash bids can be verified by direct
substitution of expressions (4), (5), and (6) into (3) , taking into account that (g) = C(g)/w(vL, g).  In order
to prove the second order condition we will show that the objective function is pseudoconcave, i.e., %2(x, g)
 0 for g < x  and %2(x, g)  0 for g > x.  First, we show that %1,2(x, g), the cross derivative of %(x, g), is
strictly positive.  In fact,
%1,2(x, g) = fN(g)(pw2 (vL, x) + (1  p)w2 (vH, x)(1 (g)) - 1)  ’(g)FN(g) (1 - p)w2(vH, x) )                (B1)
Equation (3) leads to
Substituting this expression into equation (B1), it results that %1,2(x, g) > 0 provided that 
g(1 - p)w2 (vH, x) + (pw2 (vL, x) - 1)E[w(v, g)] > 0 
It is easy to verify that the left hand side of this expression is strictly concave in p and that w2(v, xL)  w(v,
xH)/xH guarantees that the inequality is satisfied for p = 0 and p = 1.  Consider now g < x, then %1,2(x, g) > 0
implies %2(x, g) > %2(g, g) = 0, where the last equality follows from the first order condition.  Similarly, for
g > x, %1,2(x, g) > 0 implies %2(x, g) < %2(g, g) = 0.35
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Notice that the expression of C(xL) can be obtained as limx xL C(x).   In order to see that C(x) is an
increasing function, note first that 1(t, x) is strictly increasing in t as w2(v, x)  w(v, xH)/xH > 1 guarantees
that (1 - t/E[w(v, t)) is increasing in t.  Second, observe that 
which is positive as the argument of the integral is positive for 1(t, x) increasing in t.  Moreover C(x) =
(x) w(vL, x) < w(vL, x).  Finally, C(x) is larger than y as C(xL) = w(vL, xL) - xL w(vL, xL)/E[w(v, xL)] >  w(vL,
xL) - xL  y and C(x) is increasing. 
Now we show that the pure cash bidding strategy depicted in Proposition 2 is an equilibrium of the
first stage of the game satisfying the D1 criterion when potential buyers can offer any combination of equity
and cash.  In order to prove this result, recall that x(B, C) is the seller’s expectation of the type of a potential
buyer that makes an offer (B, C).  This expectation is derived from the equilibrium beliefs if an offer with B
= 0 is observed and it is determined using the D1 criterion otherwise.  Denote by 
the counteroffer that, according to Proposition 1, a seller of type v = vH  makes if it selects offer (B, C) and
holds beliefs x(B, C).  Note that the seller’s counteroffer to an offer (B, C) also depends on the belief x( B,
C) induced by this offer.  In order to describe how the D1 refinement applies to this phase of the game, we
introduce the variable q(x, B, C) defined as 36
xBC qxBC
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B(x) is the equilibrium expected payoff of a bidder of type x.  Then for a deviating offer (B,C) the
seller out of equilibrium path beliefs satisfy 
           (B2)
In other words, the seller believes that the deviation (B, C) comes from the buyer's type that would find it
attractive for the smallest winning probability.
Consider a deviation (B, C) with B > 0. It is sufficient to show that this deviation is not profitable
for the bidder of type x = x( B, C), as this is the bidder type that will most profit from such a deviation.
Upon being selected by the seller after offering (B, C), this bidder’s expected profit will be 
(1 - B)E[w(v, x(B, C))](1 - C/w(vL, x(B, C)))
Consider now an alternative pure-cash deviation (0, C’), where C’ is such that the bidder of type x(B, C) is
indifferent between winning the auction with offer (B, C) or with offer (0, C’).  In other terms C’ satisfies 
with (0, C’) = C’/w(vL, x(0, C’)), where x(0, C’) is the seller’s expectation regarding the type of a buyer
that offered (0, C’).  Thus:
(B3)
Lemma 1B:  If x(0, C’)  x(B, C), then the seller prefers a buyer that offers (0, C’) to a buyer that offers (B,
C).
Proof:  If v = vL, then the seller’s expected revenue from accepting the offer (B, C) is B(w(vL, x(B, C))
+C(1-B)  C’, which is the seller’s revenue if it accepts offer (0, C’), where the inequality follows from37
xC q xC x B C
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expression (B3) and x(0, C’)  x(B, C).  If v = vH , then the seller’s expected revenue from making a
counteroffer (0,(B,C)) to a buyer that offered (B, C) is (B + (1-B)C/w(vL, x(B, C)))w(vH, x(B, C)) < C’w(vH,
x(0, C’))/w(vL, x(0, C’)), which is its expected revenue by making a counteroffer (0,(0, C’)) to a buyer that
offered (0, C’). The inequality follows from expression (B3),  x(0, C’)  x(B, C) and the fact that
w2(v,xi)xi/w(v, xi) is not deceasing in v. a
Lemma 1B implies that if x(0, C’)  x(B, C), then the offer (0, C’) has higher probability of being accepted
by the seller than the offer (B, C).  Therefore, if a buyer of type x = x(B, C) finds that deviating to offer
(B,C) is profitable, then it must also be profitable to deviate to offer (0, C’) as the latter has higher
probability of winning the auction and provides the same payoff of (B, C).  However, from the first part of
the proof, we know that there is no pure-cash profitable deviation.  Hence a contradiction.  Thus, to
complete the proof it is sufficient to show that x(0, C’)  x(B, C) is consistent with the D1 criterion.  First,
suppose that any bidder with synergy x’ < x(B, C) receives a higher payoff from offer (B, C) than from
(0,C’), conditional on winning the auction.  It then follows that
q(x’, 0, C’)  q(x’, B, C)  q(x(B, C), B, C) = q(x(B,C), 0, C’),
where the second inequality follows from (B2) and the equality follows from the definition of C’.  Thus,
Finally, we show that if x(0, C’)x(B, C) then any bidder with synergy x’ < x(B, C) receives a higher payoff
from offer (B, C) than from (0, C’), conditional on winning the auction.  We need to show that 
       p(1 - B)( w(vL, x’) - C) + (1 - p) (1 - (B,C))w(vH, x’)  p( w(vL, x’) - C’) + (1 - p)(1 - (0, C’))w(vH,x’)38
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which can be rewritten as 
Note that equality holds for x’ = x(B, C) because of the definition of C’, whereas the inequality is strict for
x’ < x(B, C), as x(B, C) x(0, C’) and w(.) is a strictly increasing function.  aReferences
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Descriptive statistics
Statistics for means and medians, in parentheses, are reported for buyer and seller firms listed on NYSE/ASE/Nasdaq
that engaged in asset sales over the sample period 1989 through 2002, using as the means of payment cash or buyer
equity that is conveyed immediately to seller shareholders.  Statistical significance for the difference between cash
versus equity-based transactions is obtained by the Satterthwaite test for the difference in means and by the Wilcoxon
signed ranks test for the difference in medians.  The value of the transaction is calculated in millions of constant
(1997) dollars.  Buyer common stock used in payment for the asset is valued at the buyer’s share price prior to the
announcement of the transaction.  Market value is calculated as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by stock
price prior to the event announcement, and reported in millions of constant (1997) dollars.  The seller’s equity interest
in the buyer is the percentage of the buyer’s shares outstanding that seller shareholders gain as a result of the
transaction.  The percent of payment in equity is the percent of the transaction price that is paid in the form of buyer
common stock.  Insider ownership is the percentage of outstanding shares held by all officers and members of the
firm’s board of directors.  Institutional ownership is defined as the percent of outstanding shares held by investment
























Value of the transaction ($1997, millions) 1,906.5 1,380.9 1,906.5 1,380.9
(1,205.0) (1,010.7) (1,205.0) (1,010.7)




















Seller’s equity interest in buyer (%) 28.9 – 28.9 –
(24.1) – (24.1) – 
Percent of payment in equity (%) 71.3 – 71.3 –
(70.3) – (70.3) –






Institutional ownership (%) 52.0 50.7 53.9 48.7
(52.2) (54.0) (56.8) (51.1)
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Logit estimates for the choice of means of payment: equity versus cash
This table presents coefficient estimates from logit regression models for the choice between cash versus equity-
based asset sales.  The dependent variable equals one for asset sales in which the means of payment entails buyer
equity and zero for cash transactions.  All firm specific variables are based on data prior to the announcement of
the asset sale.  Research and development expenditures (including advertising) are divided by property, plant, and
equipment, calculated for the last fiscal year prior to the announcement date.  Market/book is the market value
of the firm divided by the book value of its assets.  Analyst following is the number of analysts that generate an
earnings forecast for the firm for the upcoming quarter. The analyst earnings surprise variable is the mean of the
absolute value of the difference between the median quarterly earnings estimate and the actual quarterly earnings
of the firms per share, normalized by the stock price, for the preceding year.  Analyst earnings dispersion is the
standard deviation of outstanding earnings forecasts normalized by stock price over the previous year.  The bid-
ask spread is the stock’s daily bid-ask spread, divided by share price, averaged over the month prior to the
announcement.  Trading volume is the trading volume for the stock divided by shares outstanding averaged for
the month prior to the announcement.  The size of the asset is the value of asset divided by the sum of the value
of the buyer firm plus the value of the asset, using share prices prior to the announcement of the transaction.  The
p-values are reported in parentheses; N is the sample size.
(1) (2) (3)



































































Proportion concordant 0.86 0.73 0.9
N            96          109           92T
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l
e
s
,
 
R
O
S
,
 
i
s
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
d
i
v
i
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
s
a
l
e
s
.
 
 
N
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
s
i
z
e
;
 
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
 
 
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
i
s
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
t
-
t
e
s
t
 
f
o
r
 
m
e
a
n
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
i
n
 
a
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
 
a
n
d
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
W
i
l
c
o
x
o
n
 
s
i
g
n
e
d
 
r
a
n
k
s
 
t
e
s
t
 
f
o
r
 
m
e
d
i
a
n
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
.
T
h
e
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
a
n
 
a
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
 
f
o
r
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
i
n
g
 
e
q
u
i
t
y
-
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
a
s
s
e
t
 
s
a
l
e
s
 
v
e
r
s
u
s
 
t
h
e
 
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
a
b
l
e
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
 
f
o
r
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
i
n
g
 
c
a
s
h
 
a
s
s
e
t
 
s
a
l
e
s
 
i
s
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
d
 
b
y
:
 
 
a
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
1
0
%
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
a
n
d
 
b
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
5
%
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
 
B
u
y
e
r
s
S
e
l
l
e
r
s
Y
e
a
r
-
1
 
t
o
 
0
-
1
 
t
o
 
+
1
-
1
 
t
o
 
+
2
-
1
 
t
o
 
+
3
-
1
 
t
o
 
+
4
-
1
 
t
o
 
0
-
1
 
t
o
 
+
1
-
1
 
t
o
 
+
2
-
1
 
t
o
 
+
3
 
-
1
 
t
o
 
+
4
A
.
 
 
E
q
u
i
t
y
-
b
a
s
e
d
 
a
s
s
e
t
 
s
a
l
e
 
t
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
a
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
o
n
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
 
i
n
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
,
 
R
O
A
M
e
a
n
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
2
.
0
9
(
0
.
2
0
)
 
 
 
3
.
8
5
 
b
(
0
.
0
5
)
 
4
.
4
2
 
a
(
0
.
0
3
)
 
 
5
.
3
6
 
b
(
0
.
0
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)
 
 
4
.
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.
0
4
)
M
e
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n
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
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-
0
.
7
9
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0
.
4
5
)
-
0
.
8
8
(
0
.
4
2
)
-
0
.
4
8
(
0
.
6
6
)
-
0
.
4
9
(
0
.
6
9
)
0
.
1
6
(
0
.
9
2
)
M
e
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i
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(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
1
.
5
5
(
0
.
2
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)
1
.
9
7
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0
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)
 
 
2
.
9
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)
 
 
3
.
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.
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.
6
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.
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0
.
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.
1
9
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0
.
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-
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.
5
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0
.
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4
)
0
.
1
2
(
0
.
9
4
)
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
a
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
 
r
e
t
u
r
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o
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s
a
l
e
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i
n
 
p
e
r
c
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R
O
S
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e
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n
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-
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l
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)
 
 
4
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C
a
s
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e
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s
a
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e
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r
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n
s
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c
t
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n
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h
a
n
g
e
 
i
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a
d
j
u
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e
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r
e
t
u
r
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o
n
 
a
s
s
e
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p
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O
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p
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